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ABSTRACT
This paper consists of three reports on stochastic forecasting for Social Security, on infinite horizons,
immigration, and structural time series models. 1) In our preferred stochastic immigration forecast,
total net immigration drops from current levels down to about one million by 2020, then slowly rises
to 1.2 million at the end of the century, with 95% probability bounds of 800,000 to 1.8 million at the
century's end. Adding stochastic immigration makes little difference to the probability distribution
of the old age dependency ratio. 2) We incorporate parameter uncertainty, stochastic trends, and
uncertain ultimate levels in stochastic models of wage growth and fertility. These changes sometimes
substantially affect the probability distributions of the individual input forecasts, but they make
relatively little difference when embedded in the more fully stochastic Social Security projection.
3) Using a 500-year stochastic projection, we estimate an infinite horizon balance of -5.15% of
payroll, compared to the -3.5% of the 2004 Trustees Report, probably reflecting different mortality
projections. Our 95% probability interval bounds are -10.5 and -1.3%. Such forecasts, which reflect






















This report consists of three sub-reports, which are listed below, followed by brief 
summaries of the conclusions of each.  
 
Report I. A Probabilistic Forecast of Net Migration to the United States. (Miller and 
Lee) 
Summary of Conclusions 
1.  Given the history of immigration to the US, a number of key assumptions must be 
made without a satisfactorily firm basis, such as whether to model numbers or rates, 
over what historical period to fit the model, and whether to include a trend in the 
forecast, or to impose central tendency based on expert opinion. 
2.  Experiments with a variety of approaches suggest that the probability distribution of 
the immigration forecast is not highly sensitive to these variations, although forecasts 
of the rate, with a trend, do lead to forecasts of higher numbers in the future.  
3.  Our preferred projection is based on numbers of immigrants rather than rates, and 
randomly samples trends between 0 and the historical average for each sample path. 
In this case, the projected number of net immigrants (legal and illegal) drops from 
current levels down to about one million in 2020, and then slowly rises to 1.2 million 
at the end of the century. The lower 2.5% probability bound is near 800,000 
throughout the century, after the first decade or two. The upper 97.5% bound starts at 
1.3 million, and rises quite linearly to 1.8 million at the end of the century. 
4.  With this range of models and forecasts, including immigration in the population 
forecasts makes little difference to the probability distribution of the old age 
dependency ratio, which is the item of prime importance for the Social Security 
forecasts.  
 
Report II. Structural time series models and parameter uncertainty in Stochastic 
Projections of Social Security Finances. (Anderson and Lee)  
Summary of Conclusions 
We have experimented with a variety of different specifications of the time series models 
for wage growth and fertility, which are two of the key inputs for the projections. The 
expectation was that introducing parameter uncertainty, stochastically varying trends 
terms, and uncertain ultimate levels, would make the projections more uncertain. We did 
indeed find this to be so in every case, although one version of Homer’s model, in which 
fertility was first logged, then modeled, then exponentiated, turned out to give a narrower 
probability interval than our other models including the standard ones. In some cases, the 
change in probability intervals for the individual input series was very slight, for example 
when parameter uncertainty was introduced to the fertility model, or when we used 
structural methods for wage growth. The big differences come from using an uncertain 
ultimate level for wage growth, or a structural estimate for fertility.  
 
Although some of these new models have a substantial effect on the estimated probability 
distributions for the forecasts of the inputs themselves, they seem to make much less 
difference when they are embedded in a more fully stochastic Social Security projection. 
This is good news for the stochastic projections, because it suggests that they are not so 
sensitive to the specifications of the input series as one might have feared. This is true in 
our stochastic forecasting model which has only four stochastic inputs. It would be even 
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more true in the forecasting models of Social Security and CBO with their greater 
number of inputs. One would not want to push this argument too far, of course. 
Ultimately, the stochastic forecasts of Social Security are only as good as the stochastic 
forecasts of the key input series.  
 
Report III. Stochastic Infinite Horizon Forecasts of Social Security Sustainability. 
(Lee and Anderson).  
Summary of Conclusions 
1)  Many issues surround infinite horizon forecasts, and the whole enterprise can 
certainly be questioned. Nonetheless, we have found it useful simply to extend the 
range of the stochastic forecasting models to very distant horizons. We call these 
“routine” or “business as usual” stochastic forecasts, because their uncertainty does 
not reflect the possibility of structural shifts. They understate actual uncertainty.  
2)  Both the Flat Fund Ratio Tax measure and the Unstable measure are useful simple 
approximations to the deterministic or median infinite horizon open group imbalance 
measure. The Flat Fund Ratio is the immediate and permanent tax increase that would 
be needed to hold the ratio of the Trust Fund to Costs constant over the last two years 
of the 75-year projection. It is more intuitive and therefore easier to explain than the 
Unstable measure, but it underestimates the imbalance, whereas the Unstable measure 
(explained in the report) gives a very good approximation to the infinite horizon 
measure, at least under current circumstances.  
3)  The 2004 Trustees Report indicates an infinite horizon open group imbalance equal to 
3.5% of payroll, consistent with Lee and Yamagata’s (2003) calculation using SSA 
mortality assumptions. Based on our 500-year projection with our own mortality 
forecasts, we estimate it to be 5.15%, substantially larger. Our two simple methods, 
based on our 75 year projections, indicate levels of 4.36% for the Flat Fund Ratio 
measure, and 5.21% for the Unstable measure.  
4)  Good estimates of the uncertainty of the simple measures cannot be derived from 
stochastic forecasts over the 75 year horizon, at least using the methods we have 
attempted. Therefore the simple measures are useful only for central tendency.  
5)  The “routine” uncertainty surrounding the infinite horizon estimates of Summary 
Actuarial Balance is about 40% greater than the uncertainty of the 75 year 
projections: the 95% probability interval is 9% wide versus 6.5% for the 75-year 
horizon.  
6)  Raising tax rates immediately by an amount intended to achieve sustainability would 
imply substantial chances of huge Trust Fund accumulations that neither could nor 
should be realized in practice, at least not through holdings of government bonds. 
Adaptive policies that maintain the Trust Fund ratio at a desirable level seem more 
attractive, but have not yet been explored.  
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The core engine of stochastic macro forecasting models for Social Security finances is a 
stochastic population model. The first such model was developed by Lee and Tuljapurkar 
(1994), henceforth LT94. This model treated fertility and mortality as stochastic, but took 
immigration as deterministically given at some specified rate. There were two reasons for 
doing this. One was that immigration could be viewed as a policy variable. A policy 
maker would not find it useful to be given a forecast in which a key policy level was 
treated as stochastic, and outside control. Another is that immigration appears to be more 
difficulty to forecast then either fertility or mortality, because its trend has been so 
problematic in the US. In this report we discuss the issues and options for forecasting 
immigration stochastically, and develop some different versions of stochastic forecasts of 
immigration. These are then incorporated in a LT style model for generating stochastic 
population forecasts, and the results are discussed.  
 
Forecasts of net migration to the United States are issued by the U.S. Social Security 
Administration (SSA), the U.S. Census Bureau (CB), and the United Nations (UN).  The 
different approaches of these agencies are discussed in the following paragraphs and 
summarized in Table 1.   
 
Social Security Administration 
 
SSA forecasts immigration as a separate component of their population forecast.  The 
projection assumes that changes in population size, age structure, and composition have 
no impact on the annual flow of net immigrants.   The SSA median forecast assumes no 
change in current law in which approximately 600,000 legal immigrants are admitted 
each year.   Illegal immigration is assumed to continue at half the level of legal 
immigrants.  In the short-run, owing in part of the effects of the recent amnesty, SSA 
forecasts 800,000 legal immigrants plus another 400,000 illegal immigrants for a total of 
1.2 net immigrants per year.  They project a decline in the total number of net immigrants 
toward a long-run average of 900,000 per year (600,000 legal plus 300,000 illegal).  
Their high cost variant envisions net immigration of 1.3 million per year and while the 
low cost variant sees a decline to 672,500 net immigrants per year.   Recently, the Social 
Security Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods (2003) recommended that the 
SSA Trustees change their forecast methodology and project using a net immigration 
rate, rather than numbers.  We explore the implications of both methods in our 




The Census Bureau forecasts in-migrants separately from out-migrants.  The number of 
out-migrants is based on an out-migration rate applied to the projected foreign-born 
population.  In the baseline projection, the number of in-migrants in the short-run (thru 
2020) is based on assumptions about trends in immigration by category: immediate 
relatives, numerically-limited categories, refugees, and illegal immigrants.  From 2021 to   5
2030, the projection assumes the number of in-migrants rises in response to increases in 
the dependency ratio.  From 2030 onward, the number of in-migrants is assumed to be 
fixed at the new limit of 1.45 million immigrants.  While the number of in-migrants is 
constant since 2030, the number of out-migrants fluctuates over the period in response to 
shifts in the age composition of foreign-born.  Net immigration reaches its peak in 2030 
at 1.06 million and slowly decreases to 926,000 by 2100.  The long-run values of the 
baseline forecasts of SSA and CB are surprisingly close.  In contrast, the high-low range 
of the Census Bureau is very large relative to SSA.  By 2100, the CB high-low estimates 
differ by 3 million immigrants (3 million versus 113,000).  This is about 6 times as wide 
as the SSA high-low estimates which differ by only half a million (1.3 million versus 
672,000).   Recently, the CB issued a new interim population forecast (CB, 2004).  In this 
forecast their immigration assumptions is set equal 0.938 times the year 2000 middle 
forecast plus 0.62 times the year 2000 high forecast.  This implies immigration will reach 
nearly 1.1 million per year by 2100.   
 
United Nations 
The UN forecasts net immigrants for each country based on the policy stance of the 
country.  In the case of their U.S., they forecast a decline from 1.25 million net 
immigrants per year in the late 1990s to 1.1 million by 2010, followed by a constant level 
of 1.1 million.  The UN forecast is quite close to the middle forecast of both CB and 
SSA.  The UN provides no alternative migration scenarios.  Table 1 below summarizes 
the differences among the SSA, CB, and UN in their immigration forecasts. 
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Table 1.  Summary of Methods for Immigration Forecasts by the Social Security 
Administration, Census Bureau, and United Nations. 
 
 SSA  CB  UN 






High and low cost.  High and low population sizes.  None. 
Baseline forecast is 
based on: 
Current law with 
temporary high net 
migration due to 
amnesty. 
Slight increase in response to 
increased in OADR in the decade of 
the 2020s. 
Policy stance of 
county. 
Baseline numbers:  1,200,000 (of 
whom 400,000 are 
illegal) declining to 
long-run average of 
900,000 (of whom 
300,000 are illegal) 
in 2024. 
964,000 net immigrants (1,251,000 
in-migrants and 287,000 out-
migrants).  Declines to 713,000 net 
migrants in 2010, then peaks at 
1,061,000 net migrants in 2030, 
slowly declines reaching 926,000 
net migrants in 2100.  In 2004, CB 
issued new interim projections 
which raised the median 
immigration forecast to equal 0.938 
times the old median forecast plus 
0.062 times the old high forecast.  
This implies a 2100 forecast of 
nearly 1.1 million net immigrants. 
1,250,000 declining to 
long-run average of 





whom 450,000 are 
illegal). 
High cost: 672,500 
(of whom 200,000 
are illegal) 
Low pop: 624,000 net migrants in 
2000, declining to 113,000 net 
migrants in 2100.   
High pop: 1,363,000 net migrants in 






Issued: 2004  Trustees 
Report 
2000 National Population 
Projections.  Since replaced with the 
2004 National Population 
Projections with higher immigration 
levels.   
World Population 
Prospects: The 2000 
Revision (2001). 
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The Time Series Approach to Forecasting Net Immigration 
 
We develop a probabilistic forecast of immigration.  Rather than examining three 
scenarios as done by SSA or CB, we develop thousands of possible sample paths based 
on both time series analysis of past variation and on expert opinion about the future 
course of immigration.  There are several distinct advantages of modeling uncertainty 
based on an analysis of historical times series rather than the use of high-low scenarios.  
(For an extensive discussion see Lee (2004) and Lee and Tuljapurkar, (2000)).  The time-
series approach deals with uncertainty in a probabilistic and consistent fashion.  By 
contrast, in the scenario approach, the high-low range generally lacks any probabilistic 
interpretation, so the user has no sense of how likely they are to contain the true values.  
The scenario approach assumes perfect correlation of the component trajectories (e.g., 
fertility, mortality, and migration) with each other and across time.  For example, high 
fertility is always high and is always coupled with high immigration.   It is generally not 
clear whether the high-low range is meant to contain annual variations or long-run 
averages.  The probability bands for long-run averages will be considerably narrower 
than bands for annual variations due to error cancellation over time.    
 
Ideally, we would be able to estimate a plausible and appealing time series model of the 
stochastic process based entirely on historical data, which would then be sufficient to 
identify both the long run level or trend in the input series for forecasting purposes, as 
well as identifying the variances and covariances of interest. In the case of mortality 
forecasts, this ideal case holds quite well, using the Lee-Carter (1992). However, in the 
case of fertility, there are strong theoretical reasons to expect the central tendency to have 
changed over the course of the 20
th century, but not necessarily to continue to change in 
the future. Also, there is external information about the range of possible variation that 
should be taken into account (Lee, 1993). For fertility, then, the ideal conditions are not 
met, and the forecast model takes a long term expected value from expert opinion, and 
excludes certain stochastic realizations as impossible. The real interest rate and the rate of 
growth of covered wages are handled in a similar manner, so far as central tendencies are 
concerned. For immigration, it seems clear that the historical data does not provide a fully 
adequate basis for assessing the long term trend. Even more than fertility, the course of 
immigration in the 20
th century US was dominated by very long trend like movements, 
which might or might not reasonably be expected to continue in the future. Thus there are 
difficult strategic issues to be confronted before we begin modeling, as we now consider. 
These issues are not specific to probabilistic modeling, but rather are the same issues that 
anyone constructing a deterministic projection would also have to confront.  
 
Here are some of the basic questions:  
•   Should we forecast the rate of immigration or the number of immigrants?   
•   Should we rely on the observed historical trend for our forecast?   
•   Should we use expert opinion to specify the likely trend?   
•   If relying on historical data, how far back in history should we go?  
 
The National Research Council (2000) published a report assessing the projections 
methodology of the UN, the World Bank, and the International Division of the US 
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Census Bureau. This report evaluated methods used for global projections, covering 
all countries of the world, which is not the same as preparing a projection for the US. 
Nonetheless, the chapter on immigration in the report does provide some useful 
insights for present purposes. Here are some of the relevant conclusions.  
1)  1) Errors in projecting immigration lead to errors in population projections that 
are as important as those arising from errors in projecting fertility, and far more 
important than errors in projecting mortality, in the United Nations projections 
record since 1960 or so. However, the most important errors arise for countries 
that are subject to a demographic “quake”, an unexpected political, military or 
environmental shock. Excluding these instances, the role of errors in forecasting 
immigration is only about half as great, comparable to mortality. We would not 
expect that “quakes” of this sort would be likely for the US.  
2)  It is useful to distinguish countries that have a long history as receiving countries 
for immigrants, since they are much more likely to continue in this role in the 
future. The US is a prime example. However, it is also important to realize that 
some long-time receiving countries such as Brazil and Argentina no longer 
receive many international immigrants, so reversals do occur and continuing 
status as a receiving nation cannot be taken for granted but must be assessed.  
3)  Although it is plausible that increasing globalization of markets will lead to 
increased international migratory flows in the coming decades, it is also possible 
that national policy will tend toward restricting immigration. It is also possible 
that other industrial nations will increasingly compete with the US for immigrants 
from the Third World as an antidote to population aging, as is much discussed 
these days.  
4)  Using UN data since 1950, experiments with different projection assumptions for 
immigration and emigration were carried out. For our purposes, the two most 
interesting possibilities were considered were a) assuming 0 net immigration in 
the future regardless of past levels or rates, and b) assuming that the most recent 
level of immigration (over a five year interval) continued constant in perpetuity. 
Forecasting errors were then assessed. It was found that for horizons up to ten 
years, the constant immigration flow assumption led to smaller errors than the 
zero assumption, but for horizons of 15 to 40 years, the constant immigration 
assumption led to larger errors. This was true for all countries considered 
together, and also true if countries experiencing “quakes” were considered 
separately.  
 
The National Research Council (2000) report does not explicitly address any of the 
questions posed earlier, but it does provide some general ideas about how to proceed. In 
the US, we have had a fifty year history of constantly accelerating immigration. The 
report can be read as suggesting some caution in assuming that this long and impressive 
trend will continue.  
 
Forecasting the Rate or Level of Immigration? 
 
Typically, forecasts are made of the number of immigrants rather than the immigration 
rate.  Forecasting numbers of immigrants is consistent with legislative-controls on 
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immigration which focus on numbers of legal permanent residents admitted each year.  
For example, under current U.S. immigration law the number of legal permanent 
residents admitted each year is limited to 675,000 plus unlimited numbers of immediate 
relatives (spouses and unmarried children U.S. citizens and parents of adult U.S. citizens) 
and unlimited numbers of previously-admitted refugees and asylees who are adjusting 
their immigration status.  For those admissions subject to the annual numerical cap, it is 
easy to observe the effects of these limits in the 5.3 million immigrant applications that 
are currently pending or in the average 10 year waiting time for admission of siblings of 
naturalized U.S. citizens. 
 
Recently, the SSA Technical Advisory Panel recommended that the Trustees long-run 
target for intermediate forecast be based on a net migration rate rather than a net 
migration level.  The Panel recommended the long-run target be set to a net migration 
rate of 3.2 per 1,000 (based on Wilmoth’s estimate of the net migration rate for the period 
1821-2002). The panel recommended that the high-cost scenario be based on the 
continuation of the current level of immigration (implying a declining net migration rate) 
and that the low-cost scenario be based on a continuation of the current net immigration 
rate (4.2 per 1000). The panel listed several factors which might lead to more restrictive 
immigration:  economic slowdown, national security concerns, falling fertility in sending 
regions, the dissipation of the residual immigration effects of the IRCA legalization of the 
1990s, and the increased demand for immigrants in rapidly aging Europe and Japan.  
They also listed several factors which might lead to increased immigration: demand for 
immigrant labor is likely to scale with the growth of population and the economy, the 
increased share of foreign born increases the network available for immigrants, there are 
large untapped pools of immigrants around the world, and the difficulty in immigration 
enforcement. On balance they argued: “Faced with these varied arguments, the Panel 
concluded that there is no strong reason to anticipate a sharp break with past trends in the 
near future” (Technical Panel 2003). 
 
There is another point to consider when deciding to forecast rates versus levels. In the 
context of forecasting rates stochastically, we might ask whether we expect a positive or 
negative co-variation between net immigration rates and population size.  On the one 
hand, we might expect positive co-variance arising as larger populations result from 
higher immigration rates.  On the other hand, we might expect negative co-variance as 
slower population growth might lead to increased demand for immigration.  This 
ambiguity is one reason why projecting the number of immigrants might be preferable, 
because the historical co-variations of the rate of immigration and the base population 
size to which it is applied are implicit in the projection of their product, the numbers of 
immigrants. 
 
In the models and forecasts which follow, we analyze four combinations of assumptions:  
forecasts of the net immigration rate or level and use of the observed historical trend in 
the forecast or substitution of a constant rate or level in the forecast. In addition, we 
present a forecast in which we assume that the trend in levels of immigration are 
uniformly distributed over the interval between 0-trend and the time series estimate of the 
trend.  
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Choice of a time period 
 
We begin by modeling stochastic immigration in a similar manner to the stochastic 
forecasts of fertility as in Lee (1993).  We issue a probabilistic forecast of the level of net 
immigration based on a time-series analysis of the historical series of legal immigration 
to the United States. A similar method is used to generate a probabilistic forecast of the 
net immigration rate.  The first question that arises in the context of immigration is the 
appropriate time period for the time-series estimation.  
 
Figure 1.1 shows the gross legal immigration rate from 1820 to 2002.  Two distinct 
periods are evident in the series.  The 19
th century is characterized by high and 
fluctuating rates, while the 20
th century shows much less variation with a distinct upward 
trend.  For the time series estimation we chose the period following the Federal 
Immigration Act of 1924 which permanently established immigration limits via the quota 
system.  Choice of a shorter or longer time-series would influence both the predicted 
variation and trend of the forecast.  
 
The distinct peak in legal immigration in the early 1990s represents an immigrant 
amnesty.  We chose not to model this in the simulation, since our forecast is most 
concerned with when people entered the country and not when they were legalized.  So, 
rather than include amnesties as a periodic occurrence, we stochastically forecast legal 
immigration and assume that illegal immigrants represent a fixed proportion of legal 
entries.  We use the SSA assumptions that illegal immigrant flows are ½ that of legal 
flows and that ¼ of immigrants eventually emigrate.  So, our forecast of legal immigrants 
is multiplied by 1.125 (=3/2*3/4) to transform it into a forecast of net immigrants (legal 
plus illegal). 
 
Use of the historical trend 
 
The second question that arises is whether to allow the observed historical trend to 
influence our probabilistic forecasts or to replace this with a trend provided by expert 
opinion.  On the one hand, previous studies of both mortality and fertility forecasts have 
found expert judgment to be unduly influenced by the recent past. On the other hand, if 
we have reason to believe there has been a structural shift or when there is doubt about 
the sustainability of current trends, then subjective expert opinion would be preferred.  In 
the case of probabilistic forecast of fertility (Lee 1993), it was argued that the fertility 
transition had resulted in a structural shift.  Therefore, the wiser course of action was to 
impose a lower level of fertility than that observed in the historical series.  This was done 
via a mean constrained forecast such that the mean across all trajectories tended toward 
the long-run average deemed to be 1.9 births per woman.    
 
Figure 1.2 presents the level of gross legal immigration to the U.S. from 1820 to 2002.  
This series is similar to that of the gross legal immigration rate seen in Figure 1.1.  The 
20
th century is characterized by a distinct upward trend in both the level and rate of 
immigration. 
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Figure 1.3 presents data from the United Nations on net immigration flows from 
developing nations to developed ones from 1950-2000, along with the UN forecast for 
2000-2500.  The latter part of the 20
th century is characterized by a distinct upward trend 
in the net immigration rate to developed nations.  Yet, as is evident here, the UN 
forecasts a distinct break with the past trend.  It would be interesting to investigate 
whether previous UN forecasts also envisioned a distinct break which was subsequently 
shown to be inaccurate.  The UN, SSA, and CB all forecast a leveling off of the 
immigration to the US – in sharp contrast to the experience of recent decades. 
 
In our probabilistic simulations of immigration, we consider alternative forecasts in 
which the historical trend is replaced with a subjective assumption of no trend which is 
consistent with the opinions expressed by the UN, SSA, and CB.  
 
Fitting the Time Series Model 
 
Lacking data on flows of illegal immigrants and out-migrants, the time-series was fit to 
data on legal immigrants admitted to the U.S. from 1925-2002.  Illegal immigrants who 
were granted legal permanent residence under the amnesty program of the 1990s (IRCA) 
were not included in this series.  Auto-regressive and moving average time series models 
with a linear trend (in order to de-trend the series) were fit to the level of immigrants and 
the rate of legal immigrants.  Based on Akaike information criterion, the AR(2) model 
with linear trend was found to have the best fit for both series.  (Results in Tables 2 and 
3).  We also attempted to de-trend the data by taking first differences.  However, in this 
case, the probability bounds of the resulting forecast widen very rapidly so as to reach 
quite extreme levels of immigration within a decade.  We don’t have a good justification 
for assuming the series is trend-stationary rather than difference-stationary, beyond the 
implications observed in the forecasts. 
 
 
Table 2.  Time-series estimate of Legal Immigrants to U.S. 1925-2002 
 
Coefficients: 
           ar1         ar2      intercept    seq(1925, 2002) 
        1.0077   -0.1373  -21958445  11420.363 
s.e.    0.1114   0.1232      4384448          2230.289 
 
sigma^2 estimated as 4.995e+09:  log likelihood = -982.4,  aic = 1974.8 
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Table 3.  Time-series estimate of Legal Immigration Rate to U.S. 1925-2002 
 
Coefficients: 
           ar1         ar2      intercept    seq(1925, 2002) 
        1.0599    -0.1721     -50.4855         0.0268 
s.e.    0.1107     0.1189      24.6147           0.0125 
 




The point estimates of the AR coefficients imply a stationary forecast.  However, in 
generating immigration trajectories, we sample from the joint distributions of the two AR 
coefficients.  Therefore, it is possible that for some of our samples the AR coefficients 
imply a non-stationary path.  we could have restricted the sampling so that such 
combinations were rejected.  Instead, we have placed bounds on the resulting forecasts.  
In the forecasts of immigration rates, we established an upper bound of +15 per 1,000 
(based on US historical experience) and a lower bound of -15 per 1000 (based on post-
war experience in more developed countries).  In the forecast of immigration level, we 
establish an upper bound of 4 million net immigrants per year. 
 
Previous Work 
In previous work, we stochastically forecast domestic and international migration to 
California for a probabilistic population forecast of the state (Miller, 2002).  Net domestic 
immigration to California was based on a time series analysis of the net immigration rate.  
The rate was then applied to the population total in the previous year in order to derive a 
level of net immigration.  The age/sex combination distribution of domestic immigrants 
was taken from the March CPS and was assumed to remain unchanged over the forecast.  
A similar approach has been taken in this paper.  International migration to California 
was based on a time series analysis of the proportion of immigrants intending to reside in 
California.  The forecast of this proportion was then multiplied by the Middle Series 
Forecast of Immigration to the U.S. from the Census Bureau in order to obtain the 
number of international migrants to California.   
 
Results 
Figure 1.4 compares our immigration forecasts to those of the UN, SSA, and CB.  Our 
stochastic forecast of the level of immigration without the historical trend yields a median 
forecast nearly identical to that of Social Security.  Our 95% probability interval is about 
the same width as the high-low bounds of Social Security, but both our upper and lower 
bounds on the 95% probability interval lie above that of Social Security.   The high-low 
bounds by Census Bureau are more than 4 times as wide as our 95% probability interval. 
 
Figure 1.5 shows our stochastic forecast of the level of immigration using the historical 
trend present in the time series.  In this case, the baseline scenarios of both SSA and CB 
lie below our 95% probability interval.  This reflects the fact that the baseline forecast of 
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both agencies represents a distinct break with the past. The probability distribution for the 
cumulative average of the forecast looks odd in this figure. We would expect the 
distribution for the cumulative average to lie within the distribution for the forecasts for 
individual years, but this only need happen when there is no trend in the central forecast. 
When there is a rising trend, as in this version of the model, the cumulative average 
forecasts for longer horizons reflect the lower values of forecasts at shorter horizons, 
which pull down the whole distribution below the individual year forecasts.  
 
The next set of figures compares the results of our stochastic forecast of the immigration 
rate to the forecasts of Census, SSA, and UN.  A distinct narrowing of the high-low 
bounds of Census and SSA are evident in Figure 1.6.  This is a by-product of the 
assumption of constant immigration levels with a growing population.  In contrast, our 
probability intervals (based on rates) expand over time.   By 2100, our probability 
intervals for the cumulative immigration rate are about as wide as those of the CB, and 
many times wider than those of SSA. 
 
Figure 1.7 shows the result of our stochastic forecast of the immigration rate using the 
trend present in the time series.  In this case, our median forecast shows a slight increase 
in the net immigration rate from the current level of 4.2, reaching 4.7 by 2100.  As the 
forecast horizon increases, the forecasts of CB, SSA, and UN fall below our 95% 
probability interval.  Only CB’s high population scenario lies within our 95% probability 
interval at the end of the forecast.   
 
In our view, the biggest uncertainty is in the choice of trend. We do not see a compelling 
reason to prefer either the trend extrapolation of the time series trend estimate or the 
expert opinion (expert opinion points in the direction of ignoring past trends). Therefore 
we created a mixed model in which we assume that the trend for an entire sample path is 
distributed uniformly between zero and the time series estimate of trend, for numbers of 
immigrants. In addition, there is the usual uncertainty due to innovations in the model. 
The results of this approach are plotted in the remaining diagrams with the label 
“uncertain trend”. These are our preferred results. They generally lie midway between the 
forecasts with trend and without trend, for both central tendency and probability interval.  
 
We will now consider the effects of modeling immigration stochastically rather than 
deterministically.  We have used a stochastic population model we developed for use in 
an analysis of a probabilistic forecast of Medicare (Lee and Miller, 2002), which is 
similar to Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994).  Figure 1.8 compares our alternative stochastic 
immigration forecasts with a deterministic immigration forecast.  In terms of projected 
population size, there is little difference between the forecast based on stochastic level of 
immigration without a trend and the forecast based on deterministic immigration.  Partly, 
this reflects the fact that we already have a lot of variance in the model from the two 
other stochastic components (TFR and e(0)).  In particular, forecast of the level of 
immigration adds relatively little variation to the forecast relative to that of the TFR.  The 
95% probability interval for the cumulative value of the TFR is about +/- 25% of the 
baseline TFR.   In 2002, there were 4 million births in the US, a variation in TFR of +/- 
25% would translate into +/- 1 million additional births.  In contrast, our probability 
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interval for immigration based on a model of immigration level without time series trend 
leads to differences of +/- 350,000 immigrants.  This is about 1/3 as large an effect of 
variation as in the TFR.  In addition, migrants contribute less to population size than do 
births, since the average age of migrants is near 30.  So, the actual effect of an immigrant 
on population size might be only 5/8 as large as a birth.  The variation in population size 
introduced by modeling immigration level must be closer to 1/5 as large an effect as 
modeling variation in TFR.  
 
Figure 1.8 shows much larger upside uncertainty when rates of immigration are forecast 
rather than levels, because in this case upside uncertainty in rates interacts 
multiplicatively with upside uncertainty in population size, which does not happen when 
numbers of immigrants are directly projected. We are skeptical of these large upside 
probability ranges, because it seems likely to us that rates might be negatively correlated 
with population size, whereas our projections assume these to be independent. However, 
much of this is speculation and there are no compelling arguments that we see on either 
side.  
 
Figure 1.9 shows the results of three stochastic forecasts:  one in which only fertility and 
mortality are stochastically forecast, the second in which only immigration is 
stochastically forecast, and the third in which all 3 components are stochastically 
forecast.  Here we see that the probability interval based on a stochastic forecast of 
immigration alone is about 1/4 as wide as that of simulation based on stochastic fertility 
and mortality which is close to our admittedly crude approximation of 1/5.  In contrast to 
these results, the stochastic forecasts based on rates show wider probability intervals as 
these forecasts allow for more extreme population scenarios in which a high level of 
population can be matched with a high immigration rate and vice versa.  As expected, the 
median of the forecasts based on rates are higher than those forecasts based on level of 
immigration.   
 
Turning to a consideration of the old-age dependency rate in Figure 1.10, we find that 
forecasts based on immigration rate tend to produce younger populations than those 
based on levels. We also note that over the first 50 years of the forecast (see Table 4 
below), the OADR in all these methods are surprisingly close – suggesting that 
uncertainty in immigration would contribute little to uncertainty in social security 
finances.   
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Table 4.  OADR in 2050.  Simulation begins in 2003 with OADR at 216 per 1,000. 
 
  Type of immigration forecast: 














382 382 370 372 363 
97.5 
percentile 
472 467 458 461 456 
 
 
Foreign born population 
 
In a stationary population, we can calculate the percent of the population which is 
foreign-born based on the person-years lived of natives versus foreign-born.  Assume that 
there is no difference in mortality between natives and foreign-born.  In this case, the 
difference between the person-years lived in the U.S. by immigrants and by natives is 
simply (T(0)-T(30))/T(0))  where 30 is taken to be the average age of arrival of an 
immigrant.  Using a recent life table, we can calculate this value as about 5/8.  So the 
steady state estimate of the percent foreign-born in the population is simply (5/8*I)/(B + 
(5/8*I), where I is the net immigration rate and B is the crude birth rate  Currently, the 
US the net immigration rate is about 4/1000 and the crude birth rate is about 14/1000.  A 
steady-state calculation leads to a population of about 15% foreign-born. 
 
Using Census data and the assumptions of the SSA forecasts, we have calculated the 
foreign born population as a percent of the working-age population and of the total 
population in Figure 1.11.  We see that our crude estimate of 15% foreign-born from the 
preceding calculation is quite close to the projection for the US.  
 
Projected Net Immigrants 
Figure 12 shows the projected numbers and probability intervals of net immigrants, legal 
and illegal combined. Our preferred projection is based on the “uncertain trend” 
approach. The central forecast for this case shows the number of net immigrants dropping 
from current levels down to about one million in 2020, and then slowly rising to about 
1.2 million at the end of the century. The lower 2.5% probability bound is near 800,000 
throughout the century, after the first decade or two. The upper 97.5% bound starts at 1.3 
million, and rises quite linearly to 1.8 million at the end of the century.  
  
Summary and Conclusions 
1.  Given the history of immigration to the US, a number of key assumptions must be 
made without a satisfactorily firm basis, such as whether to model numbers or rates, 
over what historical period to fit the model, and whether to include a trend in the 
forecast, or to impose central tendency based on expert opinion. 
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2.  Experiments with a variety of approaches suggest that the probability distribution of 
the immigration forecast is not highly sensitive to these variations, although forecasts 
of the rate, with a trend, do lead to forecasts of higher numbers in the future.  
3.  Our preferred projection is based on numbers of immigrants rather than rates, and 
randomly samples trends between 0 and the historical average for each sample path. 
In this case, the projected number of net immigrants (legal and illegal) drops from 
current levels down to about one million in 2020, and then slowly rises to 1.2 million 
at the end of the century. The lower 2.5% probability bound is near 800,000 
throughout the century, after the first decade or two. The upper 97.5% bound starts at 
1.3 million, and rises quite linearly to 1.8 million at the end of the century. 
4.  With this range of models and forecasts, including immigration in the population 
forecasts makes little difference to the probability distribution of the old age 
dependency ratio, which is the item of prime importance for the Social Security 
forecasts.  
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Figure 1. Legal Immigration Rate: US, 1820−2002
 (Dashed spike indicates amnesty immigration)





































Figure 2.  Legal Immigrants to U.S., 1820−2002
 (Dashed spike indicates amnesty immigration)
























sFigure 3.  United Nations Estimate (1950-2000) and Forecast (2000-2050) 





















































Figure 4.  Gross Legal Immigrants, 1820−2002 with Forecast of Net Immigrants
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Figure 5.  Gross Legal Immigrants, 1820−2002 with Forecast of Net Immigrants
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Figure 6. Gross Legal Immigration Rate, 1925−2002 with Forecasts of Net Immigration Rate
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Figure 7. Gross Legal Immigration Rate, 1925−2002 with Forecasts of Net Immigration Rate
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Figure 12.  Gross Legal Immigrants, 1820−2002 with Forecast of Net Immigrants
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The strategy for constructing stochastic Social Security forecasts at the macro-level rests 
on developing stochastic time series models for a number of the key inputs. In the 
original Lee-Tuljapurkar implementation (Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1998a&b, 2000; 
Tuljapurkar and Lee, 2000; Lee, Anderson and Tuljapurkar, 2003), these key inputs are 
fertility, mortality, real interest rates and the growth rate of covered real wages, with 
returns on equity sometimes included as well. This report also experiments with 
stochastic immigration.  
 
However, using time series methods in this way goes well beyond their intended range of 
application, and poses special problems deriving from the length of the forecast horizon 
(typically 75 years) and, in the case of fertility, from special constraints on possible 
outcomes. There has been a certain amount of experimentation with different estimation 
strategies in the past. Lee (1993) constrained the expected value of the modeled fertility 
process to equal a prespecified value based on external evidence including expert 
opinion. Similarly, upper and lower bounds were imposed on the realized Total Fertility 
Rate in any year through a nonlinear transformation. Tuljapurkar found that this 
transformation imposed an implausible shape on the probability distribution of fertility 
outcomes. Consequently, Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994) instead constrained only the mean 
value, and then discarded stochastic sample paths that included outcomes deemed outside 
a prespecified range (e.g. paths with negative realizations for fertility were discarded). 
Tuljapurkar and Boe (1998b) experimented with various aspects of the specification, 
notably including uncertainty in the prespecified mean level of fertility. Lee, Carter and 
Tuljapurkar (1995) tried a structural time series model for mortality (with a random 
trend), and found that it made very little difference either to the central forecast or to its 
variance and uncertainty.  
 
More recently, Holmer (2003) found that “the methods that have evolved for stochastic 
projection of trust fund finances are basically sound”, but at the same time found that the 
time series methods currently in use for these stochastic Social Security forecasts had 
problems, and suggested that structural time series models and alternative Monte Carlo 
procedures might solve these problems. He found that replacing the usual ARIMA 
models with these new models altered the projections, particularly the assessment of 
uncertainty. Burdick and Manchester (2003) echoes interest in these new specifications, 
and concern that the usual ARIMA models may understate the uncertainty of the 
projections.  
 
Holmer (2003) suggested and illustrated three alternative modeling strategies: a) the use 
of structural time series models for all inputs; b) the effects of uncertainty about the true 
values of estimated parameters, that is to “treat these estimated coefficients themselves as 
random, adding additional uncertainty to the stochastic models”; and c) “the ultimate 




In this report, we will investigate these suggestions, considering their effects both on the 
forecasts of the input series and their uncertainty, and also the effect of these new fitted 
models on the actual outcomes of the stochastic Social Security projections when all 
sources of variation are considered together. Stochastic forecasts of mortality have 
incorporated parameter uncertainty from the beginning, since Lee and Carter (1992) took 
uncertainty in the drift coefficient into account, and for the most part that practice has 
continued.  
 
We will begin by considering new modeling approaches for real wage growth, and then 
incorporate the resulting models in a stochastic Social Security forecast in which all the 
other inputs are first treated deterministically, and then treated stochastically. We will 
next do the same for fertility.  
Remodeling Real Wage Growth 
Structural time series models 
We estimated a structural model for productivity growth in an attempt to replicate 
Holmer's structural time series model; as reported later, we proceeded similarly for 
fertility. As did Holmer, we constructed state space representations for these models and 
fitted them through a combination of Kalman filter and maximum likelihood techniques.  
We used the publicly available E
4 statistical package (available at 
http://www.ucm.es/info/icae/e4/e4download.htm) for parameter estimation and 
smoothing with the Kalman filter. 
 
Holmer presented two structural models for productivity growth which we duplicate here.  
We first estimate a model which incorporates a time-varying mean displacement, and we 
then add to this model uncertainty in the long-term average of the simulated series (what 
Holmer calls the "ultimate value assumption.") 
 
While Holmer fitted the productivity growth rate series, we fit the related real-wage 
growth series (the last column of Table V.B1 in the 2003 Trustees' Report) after adjusting 
the historical estimates for changes in the composition of the labor force. In our model of 
the Trust Fund, this latter series provides a more appropriate basis for adjusting payroll 
tax profiles by age and sex over time. 
 
Holmer's first model fitted the productivity growth rate with a long run trend and a time 
varying mean displacement.  He estimates the slope of long run trend to be zero, and thus 
simulates the series using only the remaining time-varying mean displacement.   
 
We fit the model without a long run trend, using only the time-varying mean 
displacement equation.  The equations for this model are: 
 
yt = γt-1 + εt, εt ˜ N(0,σε
2)    
 




where yt represents the observed growth in real wages at time t, and γt represents the 
time-varying mean displacement.  We estimate λ to be 0.758, σε




Figure 2.1 shows the result of simulating the model as compared with a simple AR(1) 
model as used in our past simulations, where it is the time series of real wage growth that 
is being simulated here, not its impact on the Trust Fund.  For these simulations, we used 
a long run mean rate of real wage growth of 1.1%, equal to the intermediate cost 
assumption from the 2003 Trustees' report. The solid line prior to 2002 shows the 
historical series, and the dashed line shows the smoothed estimate of the time-varying 
mean displacement.  The outer solid lines after 2002 show the 95% confidence interval 
from the AR(1) model, and the outer dotted lines show the 95% confidence interval for 
the structural model with time-varying mean displacement.  The lines in the center show 
the median for each model, and the lines between the 95% confidence interval and the 
median show the 95% confidence interval for the cumulative mean. These cumulative 
mean plots, introduced by Lee (1993), are intended to capture a projection dispersion that 
is conceptually closer to the High-Medium-Low assumptions of traditional scenario-
based projections, or in the case of Social Security, the High, Intermediate and Low-Cost 
projection assumptions. The plot shows that the uncertainty in the stochastic trajectories 
is only slightly greater for the structural model, but that the cumulative mean is somewhat 
more uncertain for the structural model. 
Uncertain Ultimate Rate of Wage Increase 
We then fit the model with uncertainty in the long run mean, or with an "uncertain 
ultimate value."  We estimated uncertainty using Holmer's method, calculating the 
standard deviation of the ultimate value as the sum of the standard deviation for the 
historical mean plus the standard deviation for the projection deviation.  This is 








2 represents the variance of the assumed ultimate value, σh
2 represents the 
variance of the historical mean, and σd
2 represents the variance of the projection 
deviation.  We estimated σh  to be 0.2553 percent, using the usual equation for the sample 
mean, and set σd equal to 1.1384 percent, that standard deviation such that there is a 20% 
chance of the long run mean exceeding the historical mean.  According to these 
estimates, σu is estimated to be 1.1667 percent, which is considerably larger than 
Holmer's estimate of 0.455 percent. 
 
Figure 2.2 show the effect of incorporating uncertainty in the ultimate value.  The solid 
lines past 2002 represent the projection of the structural model above, with no uncertain 
ultimate value, and the dashed lines show the projection of the model incorporating 
uncertainty in the ultimate value.  The outer dashed lines show the 95% confidence 
interval for the model with an uncertain ultimate value, and the dashed lines in between 
represent the 95% confidence interval for the cumulative mean.  The plot demonstrates 
that incorporating uncertainty into the mean results in a substantial increase in the 
uncertainty of the real wage growth rate forecast, just as Holmer found.  
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Social Security Projections with the New Wage Growth Models—Only Wage 
Growth Stochastic 
We then incorporated forecasts from the three real wage models above into our stochastic 
social security simulation to determine the effect of the increased uncertainty on fund 
forecasts.  We first ran our simulation setting as deterministic all inputs except for the 
real wage growth rate forecast, using the 2003 Trustees' report intermediate forecasts. 
Figure 2.3 shows histograms of the 75-year actuarial balance ("AB75"), using each of the 
three models of real wage growth.  The solid line represents the distribution of the AB75 
using a simple AR(1) model, the dotted line represents the distribution of the AB75 using 
the structural model without uncertainty in the ultimate value, and the dashed line shows 
the distribution of the AB75 using the structural model with uncertainty in the ultimate 
value.  The increase in uncertainty between the AR(1) model and the structural model is 
comparatively minor, as the width of the 95% confidence interval increases by a margin 
of only 0.30%. However, a substantial increase in uncertainty results when uncertainty in 
the ultimate value is incorporated, as the width of the 95% confidence interval is 
increased by 2.54% as compared with the AR(1) model, and 2.24% as compared with the 
structural model absent uncertainty in the ultimate value. This is consistent with the 
results reported by Holmer. 
Social Security Projections with the New Wage Growth Models—All Inputs 
Stochastic 
However, when we set as stochastic all inputs to the trust fund simulation (which 
includes uncertainty in fertility, mortality, and interest rates, in our usual simulation), the 
effect of using the three different real wage growth models is less dramatic.  Figure 2.4 
shows the distribution of AB75 for the three models when all inputs are forecasted 
stochastically.  As above, the solid lines represent the distribution of AB75 when the 
AR(1) model for real wage growth is used, the dotted line represents the distribution of 
AB75 when the structural model is used, and the dashed line represents the distribution of 
AB75 when the structural model with uncertainty in the ultimate value is used.  Here, the 
effect of the increase in uncertainty in AB75 under the three models for real wage growth 
is attenuated by the uncertainty in other inputs to the fund simulation.  The width of the 
95% confidence interval is increased by only 0.15% when the AR(1) model is compared 
with the simple structural model, and by 1.01% when the AR(1) model is compared with 
the structural model combined with uncertainty in the ultimate value.  
 
Holmer did not report similar results for his simulation, as he compared only the effect of 
the models when all other inputs were forecasted deterministically. 
Discussion 
When we use the different models of wage growth in the Social Security projection with 
only wage growth stochastic, we found that the model specification had a large effect on 
the projection uncertainty, consistent with Homer’s result. Specifically, we found that the 
uncertain ultimate level generated a probability interval three times wider than did either 
the ARMA or the structural models, which had very similar effects. However, when we 
use the different models in a stochastic Social Security simulation in which all our 
standard inputs are stochastic (mortality, fertility, real wage growth and real interest 
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rates), we find that the difference in probability intervals is relatively small, differing by a 
factor of 1.16 in the 95% range (median values were similar).  
 
These two results seem contradictory, but they are not. There are four random variates in 
our stochastic Social Security model, and if the variations are largely uncorrelated one 
with the other, then there will be a good deal of cancellation when they are summed by 
the projection process. A large effect on an individual series can get swamped in the 
aggregated uncertainty, as seems to be happening here. For the same reason, probability 
intervals are quite similar between our model with only four stochastic inputs, and the 
Social Security Administration version which has many more (Burdick and Manchester, 
2003).  
Remodeling Fertility 
The Baseline Fertility Model 
We take the Lee-Tuljapurkar fertility model as our baseline. We start by applying a 
singular value decomposition to a matrix of age-specific fertility rates over time, 
selecting out the first vectors along the time and age dimensions corresponding to the 
highest singular value. We then model the vector along the time dimension (which we 
denote kt) using an ARMA(1,1) model. Stochastic forecasts of the fertility series are 
generated by this model, with the added constraint that the long-term mean of the series 
yields a total fertility rate of 1.95 children per woman, corresponding to the Trustees' 
intermediate forecast in recent reports. 
Added Parameter Uncertainty 
Here we add parameter uncertainty to the model.  Using the Splus function arima.mle(), 
we fit the model to the kt series and obtain the variance-covariance matrix of the 
maximum likelihood estimates for the moving average and autoregressive coefficients.  
We then stochastically generate 1,000 pairs of coefficients with the desired covariance 
structure.  This is done by generating a 1000x2 matrix of standard normal variates, and 
postmultiplying this matrix with the Cholesky decomposition of the estimated variance-
covariance matrix.  Then for each pair of stochastic coefficients, we generate a trajectory 
using the corresponding ARMA(1,1) model. 
 
Figure2.5 shows the result of incorporating parameter uncertainty into the model.  The 
outer solid lines show the 95% confidence interval for the ARMA(1,1) model without 
parameter uncertainty, and the outer dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval for 
the model with parameter uncertainty.  The lines between the median and the outer lines 
show the 95% confidence intervals for the cumulative averages for each model.  
Uncertainty in the trajectories is only slightly greater when parameter uncertainty is 
incorporated into the model.  Uncertainty in the cumulative average is slightly greater for 
the usual model over a horizon of twenty years or so, but greater for the model with 
parameter uncertainty past twenty years. 
Homer’s Structural Model for Logged Fertility 
We begin by replicating Holmer's structural model, which is based on an initial log 
transform of fertility, in an attempt to determine the effect on Trust Fund forecasts of 
using his fitted model.  As Holmer did, we started with the log of total fertility, and 
subtracted off the historical mean, resulting in a series which he denotes as yt.  Dropping 
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the terms of the model that he estimates to be zero, we are left with the following 
equations: 
 
yt = φ1yt-1 + φ2yt-2 + µt-1 + εt, εt ˜ N(0,σε
2) 
 
µt = ρµt-1 + γt-1 
 
γt = λ γt-1 + νt ˜ N(0,σν
2) 
 
The corresponding parameter estimates are taken from Holmer (2003). 
 
Figure 2.6 shows the result of simulating the total fertility rate using Holmer's model, as 
compared with our usual ARMA(1,1). The plot shows the unlogged total fertility rate 
series, after generating the stochastic trajectories using the model of the log of the total 
fertility rate.  The solid lines show the result of simulating the ARMA(1,1) model, and 
the dashed lines show the result of simulating Holmer's model. 
 
As demonstrated by the plot, the uncertainty resulting from Holmer's structural model is 
substantially less than that implied by the ARIMA model.  However, the plot also 
demonstrates a difficulty that arises by using the log of the total fertility rate as the series 
to be modeled.  First, when the stochastic trajectories from the simulated logged series 
are transformed back into unlogged fertility rates, a substantial amount of asymmetry 
results in the uncertainty around the median.  That is, uncertainty above the median is 
substantially greater than that below the median.  Second, there is no natural way to 
determine the jump-off point for the stochastic simulation.  When the yt series as 
described above is used, the jump off point is below 0, and the generated trajectories 
immediately drop well below the natural jump-off point of TFR= 1.97 (the most recently 
observed historical value).  On the other hand, if the yt series is scaled after fitting the 
model, such that the jump-off point is near the most recently observed value, the 
generated trajectories fluctuate wildly for the first few years of the forecast.  If the 
generated yt trajectories are instead generated, converted to unlogged rates, and a 
constant is then added to the trajectories to match the observed jump-off value of the 
TFR, then the amount of uncertainty is far too small. 
 
In short, because any transformation of the model back to unlogged rates is a nonlinear 
one, there is no reasonable way to convert Holmer's model into a reasonable simulation 
of raw fertility rates.  Unfortunately Holmer does not address this issue, as he plots only a 
simulation of the log of the TFR and does not explain how he converts the series into 
input for his model of the Trust Fund. 
A structural model for unlogged fertility 
We then fit a structural model for fertility rates, adopting a simplified version of Holmer's 
model.  We started with the kt series as constructed above, and subtracted off the 
historical mean. We then modeled kt with an autoregressive term with a time varying 




kt = φ kt-1 + µt-1 + εt, εt ˜ N(0,σε
2) 
 
µt = λµt-1 + νt, νt ˜ N(0,σν
2) 
 
where µt represents the time-varying mean displacement, and εt and νt are independent 
normal random variates.  Using the Kalman filter approach described above, we 









Figure2.7 shows the result of using this model to forecast the total fertility rate. The outer 
solid lines show the 95% confidence interval for the usual ARMA(1,1) model, and the 
dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval for the structural model. The lines 
between the 95% confidence intervals and the medians show the 95% confidence 
intervals for the cumulative averages.  As the plot demonstrates, uncertainty is 
substantially greater for the structural model, largely reflecting the fact that the 
autoregressive coefficient for the time-varying mean displacement is very close to the 
unity. 
 
For the ARMA fertility model, the 95% probability interval toward the end of the 
forecast period ranges from about .8 to 3.1 births per woman for the TFR, a span of 2.3 
births. For the structural time series model, the 95% interval ranges from about .3 to 3.3 
births per woman, or by about 3.0 births. One might question whether this broader range 
is appropriate, but in any case, it is clear that the structural time series model for fertility 
has substantially increased the uncertainty of the forecast.  
The Effect on Stochastic Projections of Alternative Fertility Models 
We used the above fertility forecasts from Holmer's structural model (see Figure 2.8) as 
input to our stochastic trust fund simulation.  Figure 2.9 shows the distribution of AB75 
when using Holmer's model as compared with our usual fund simulation using the Lee-
Tuljapurkar ARMA(1,1) model.  The 95% confidence interval using Holmer's model is (-
5.55%, 0.002%), as compared with (-5.88%, 0.25%) for the ARMA(1,1) model, a 
difference of 0.578%.  Holmer's model also results in a slightly more pessimistic forecast, 
with a median AB75 of -2.31% as compared with -2.19% for our usual model.  
Discussion and Conclusions  
We have experimented with a variety of different specifications of the time series models 
for wage growth and fertility, which are two of the key inputs for the projections. The 
expectation was that introducing parameter uncertainty, stochastically varying trends 
terms, and uncertain ultimate levels, would make the projections more uncertain. We did 
indeed find this to be so in every case, although one version of Homer’s model, in which 
fertility was first logged, then modeled, then exponentiated, turned out to give a narrower 
probability interval than our other models including the standard ones. In some cases, the 
change in probability intervals for the individual input series was very slight, for example 
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when parameter uncertainty was introduced to the fertility model, or when we use 
structural methods for wage growth. The big differences come from using an uncertain 
ultimate level for wage growth, or a structural estimate for fertility.  
 
Although some of these new models have a substantial effect on the estimated probability 
distributions for the forecasts of the inputs themselves, they seem to make much less 
difference when they are embedded in a more fully stochastic Social Security projection. 
This is good news for the stochastic projections, because it suggests that they are not so 
sensitive to the specifications of the input series. This is true in our stochastic forecasting 
model which has only four stochastic inputs. It would be even more true in the 
forecasting models of Social Security and CBO with their greater number of inputs. One 
would not want to push this argument too far, of course. Ultimately, the stochastic 
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Solid lines = AR model
Dotted lines = Structural model
Dashed line = Smoothed mean












































Solid lines = AR model
Dashed line = Structural model with uncertain ultimate value




















Solid: AR model [−2.96  −2.44  −1.91]
Dotted: Structural model [−3.11  −2.45  −1.76]
Dashed: Structural model, UUV [−4.15  −2.45  −0.56]




















Solid: AR model [−5.88  −2.19  0.25]
Dotted: Structural model [−6.10  −2.21  0.18]
Dashed: Structural model, UUV [−6.48  −2.23  0.66]


















Dashed: ARMA(1,1) with parameter uncertainty



















































































Solid: ARMA(1,1) model [−5.88  −2.19  0.25]
Dotted: Holmer’s Structural model [−5.55  −2.31  0.002]
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Many analysts agree that there are severe problems with the 75-year summary actuarial 
balance as a measure of the long term fiscal soundness of the system, because it takes no 
account of what happens after the 75 year horizon, and therefore does not measure what it 
would cost to put the system on a sustainable footing. For closely related reasons, it is not 
time-consistent: given exactly the same underlying economic and demographic 
projections, it will nonetheless deteriorate from one year to the next due to the loss of a 
good year at the start of the evaluation period and the addition of a bad year at the end.  
 
Lee and Yamagata (2003) developed analytic methods for making infinite horizon 
projections, and also discuss simpler measures which can be calculated from the standard 
75 year projection under certain assumptions about stability, in which case they are 
equivalent to a certain kind of infinite horizon projection. One of these, that they call the 
Flat Fund Ratio Tax, is the immediate and permanent tax increase that would leave the 
ratio of the Trust Fund to Costs constant at the end of the projection horizon, a measure 
that has also been included in recent Trustees Reports.  
 
Prior to 1965 the Actuaries assessed solvency over an infinite horizon or “in perpetuity” 
(Myers, 1959). After 1965, the infinite horizon was replaced by a 75-year horizon on the 
recommendation of the Advisory Council (Goss, 1999). According to Goss this had a 
relatively small effect on the long-run cost projections at that time, because costs were 
projected to remain flat in any case, rather than rising exponentially as they do now. 
Starting in 1973, the projections assumed a changing time path for earnings and benefits, 
since new legislation linked benefits to past earnings, and consequently use of an infinite 
horizon might make a considerable difference.  
 
The 2003 Trustees Report included an infinite horizon measure for the first time in many 
decades, which agreed with the Lee-Yamagata calculations in showing that the budget 
shortfall was about twice as great relative to payroll as for the 75-Year Summary 
Actuarial Balance. These estimates were repeated in the 2004 TR. The method is 
described as follows: “The [infinite horizon] extension assumes that the current-law 
OASDI program and the demographic and economic trends used for the 75-year 
projection continue indefinitely.” (TR 2004:58, text in brackets is added by us)  
 
It is well known that central forecasts by economists, demographers and actuaries often 
deviate seriously from actual outcomes even a few years ahead, which is in the nature of 
the undertaking. Lee and Tuljapurkar (1998a and b, and 2000) and Lee, Anderson and 
Tuljapurkar (2003) developed probabilistic or stochastic projections of the finances of the 
Social Security system. Details of the methods are described in the papers cited. 
Subsequently, the Congressional Budget Office developed a stochastic projection model, 
and then in 2003 the Office of the Actuary of the Social Security Administration also 
developed their own version. The projections of date of fund exhaustion were compared 
across these three models (Burdick and Manchester, 2003), and agreement was quite 
close among these three macro-stochastic forecasts. 
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These stochastic forecasts indicate a considerable range of uncertainty over a 75 year 
horizon. Given the substantial uncertainty inherent in long term forecasts, it is 
questionable how seriously we should take infinite horizon forecasts. Can they really be 
trusted as the basis for serious policy decisions today? The very phrase “infinite horizon 
forecast” makes many people snicker, and indeed many serious demographers believe it 
is pointless and misleading to forecast population beyond 25 years or so. In principle, it 
would therefore be useful to have probability intervals for the infinite horizon forecasts, 
giving an idea of how far from the central forecast the actual outcomes might lie. This 
project will investigate the possibilities of developing probability intervals for infinite 
horizon forecasts, building on unpublished work by Lee and Yamagata and using the 
stochastic projection model described earlier. Of course, construction of probability 
intervals also requires assumptions about the regularity of history, and one need only 
count back 500 years from the present to a time before Shakespeare to get some idea of 
how difficult and potentially misleading the whole enterprise might be. Nonetheless, we 
believe it is worthwhile to make the attempt. However, it should be understood and kept 
in mind that the we incorporate into our forecasts only uncertainty that arises within the 
context of assumed structural continuity and homogeneity. This means that we assume 
that expected or long term average rate of growth of covered wages remains the same 
over 500 years, as does the expected rate of decline of mortality, the expected level of 
fertility, and the expected level of real interest rates on government bonds. Random 
variations about these expected values do occur, but the expected values themselves are 
constant. Also, we assume that the current program structure remains the same except for 
already legislated changes in the normal retirement age. Thus the forecasts are 
conditional on current program structure, as they should be if they are intended to 
illuminate the extent of need for policy change. We call this kind of forecast uncertainty 
“routine” or “business as usual” to acknowledge that it excludes deep structural change, 
and kinds of shocks and trend breaks that were not observed in the past century. Thus the 
uncertainty we include understates the true amount of uncertainty.  
 
Assumptions, Procedures and Measures 
Basic Methods 
The basic strategy is the same one described above by the Trustees Report. We have a 
method for making probabilistic forecasts over a horizon of 75 or 100 years, and we just 
keep going, assuming that the same ultimate levels of fertility, rate of real wage growth, 
real interest rate, and rate of mortality decline continue, while the structure of Social 
Security conforms to current law (including the legislated increase in the normal 
retirement age to 67). We are interested in present values and their ratios over the infinite 
horizon. Present values involve discounting at the real rate of 3.0% annually, and given a 
rate of population growth that tends toward .5% per year, and a rate of growth in the 
covered real wage that tends toward 1.1% per year, the net effect will be that the 
discounting dominates, and what happens S years in the future will count for only e
-.014*S 
relative to the present. After 300 years, outcomes get a weight of only .015, and after 500 
years, a weight of only .0009. In practice, then, we carry out our projections for 500 
years, but not beyond. We will confirm below that this is a reasonable practical horizon.  
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Stochastic Infinite Horizon Methods 
As described elsewhere (Lee et al, 2003), we impose the TR intermediate assumptions as 
long term expected values for fertility (TFR = 1.95), real interest rates (.030), and real 
wage growth (.011). For mortality, we use our own projections based on recent 
implementations (Lee and Miller, 2001) of the Lee-Carter (1992) model. Other inputs, 
including immigration, are treated as deterministic in the model used here. The 
simulation starts with the Trust Fund balance from the 2003 Trustees' Report, which 
states total assets of $1.378 trillion at the end of calendar year 2002.  
 
Of all these variables, only mortality is projected to have a continuing trend. Each age 
specific death rate is assumed to decline at its own exponential rate (roughly speaking) 
for 500 years, where the rates of decline are based on historical estimates. Figures 3.1 and 
3.2 plot the life expectancies, for males and for females, that result from this procedure, 
along with the 95% probability intervals that are generated by the method. Surprisingly 
(to us, at least) our fitted model predicts that life expectancy will not exceed 100 years 
until some time between 2400 and 2500, and will only slightly exceed 100 by 2500. We 
view these forecasts as too low. There are several reasons why this might be so. First, we 
fit the model using a weighted Singular Value Decomposition procedure (Wilmoth, 1993) 
instead of our usual unweighted SVD, and we believe that this leads to lower forecasts 
even over normal horizons. Second, our procedures constrain survivorship to become 
zero at age 120. Third, our projections assume that the age pattern of rates of decline 
remains unchanged. However, it is entirely possible that this age pattern of rate of decline 
will itself change dramatically in the coming centuries, which could permit much larger 
increases in life expectancy. 
 
We note that a recent paper by Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) found that record life 
expectancy among the world’s populations with suitable data had been increasing linearly 
at nearly 2.5 years per decade or 25 years per century. If that trend were to continue, then 
life expectancy would be roughly 200 years by the year 2500, or twice our projected 
level. There are many biologists who believe that life expectancies of 150 or more could 
be attained in this century. There are also biologists who believe that life expectancy is 
unlikely to exceed 85 or so. Without necessarily subscribing to any of the views we just 
mentioned, we nonetheless conclude that our central projection is too low.  
 
The 95% probability intervals on our projected life expectancies are less than ten years 
wide, which also strikes us as unrealistically narrow for such a long horizon. Indeed, the 
span of the interval is not much different than the span of our interval for the forecast 
only to 2075. One reason for the narrow uncertainty range is that the rapidly rising age 
pattern of mortality (death rates double every seven years of age) means that even large 
variations in the levels of the age specific death rates translate into small variations in life 
expectancy. As noted above, the age pattern or age specific mortality could change 
dramatically in the coming centuries, leading to very different mortality trends. This sort 
of uncertainty is not reflected in our probability intervals. One might say that our 
probability intervals reflect only a small portion of the true extent of the unknown.  
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All these projections or input series assume constant central tendencies. In another 
section of this report, we discuss structural time series models in which the central 
tendencies themselves can vary over time, for example as random walks or ARIMA 
processes (see also Holmer, 2003). Over a 500 year horizon, a random walk would most 
likely stray implausibly far from its starting value, leading to impossible levels of fertility 
or interest rate, for example. However, a structural process with a stochastic but 
equilibrating central tendency could perhaps reflect uncertainty more adequately. In any 
event, here we will proceed as described, although mindful of the problems with doing 
so.  
Simplified Measures and Rules of Thumb 
Lee and Yamagata (2003) developed two measures of long-run sustainability which do 
not require actually carrying out detailed projections beyond the standard 75 year 
horizon. One of these is the Flat Fund Ratio Tax, which was described above. They show 
that under a strong assumption of stability, that is that revenues and costs grow at equal 
and constant exponential rates after the end of the projection period, then this Flat Fund 
Ratio Tax is identical to the infinite horizon summary actuarial balance. Consequently, 
we will often call it the Stable measure. This simple measure has the virtue that it is easy 
to explain to policy makers and the public. The idea that the ratio of the Trust Fund to the 
costs of benefits should not be falling at the end of the projection period is just common 
sense. In this report, we will investigate the performance of this measure relative to the 
actual 500 year horizon calculations. It is also possible to calculate the probability 
distribution of the Flat Fund Ratio Tax in a stochastic projection over the 75 year horizon, 
provided one smoothes the projected paths a bit near the 75 year horizon, so that changes 
in the Fund Ratio are not dominated by short term noise.  
 
If we calculate the actual rates of change of revenues and costs from the Trustees’ Report, 
we find that costs are growing more rapidly than revenues, so that the stability 
assumption is not warranted. Therefore we should expect that the Flat Fund Ratio Tax 
will underestimate the infinite horizon imbalance. This leads us to a second measure that 
is slightly more complicated but can also be calculated directly from the 75-year 
projections regularly published by the Trustees. This measure assumes that costs and 
revenues continue to change after the 75 year horizon at the same exponential rate that 
they were changing at the end of the projection period, say between year 74 and year 75. 
We called this the “Unstable” measure. Under current conditions (rate of growth of costs 
exceeding that of revenues) it will indicate a larger infinite horizon imbalance than the 
Flat Fund Ratio Tax measure. As with the Stable measure, it is possible to calculate a 
probability distribution for the unstable measure, based on stochastic projections over a 
75 year horizon.  
 
Below, we will assess the accuracy and usefulness of these simpler measures, taking the 
actual 500 year projection as the gold standard.  
Results 
For reference purposes, it will be useful to recall that the 2003 Trustees’ Report reported 
an infinite horizon Actuarial Balance of -3.7% of payroll, while the 2004 Trustees’ 
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Report reported -3.5%, both consistent with Lee and Yamagata (2003) when the Social 
Security Actuary’s mortality projection is used.  
The 75-Year Actuarial Balance is not a Sustainability Measure 
The problems with the 75-year Actuarial Balance, or AB75, are illustrated in Figure 3.3 
which shows the probability distribution of the projected Trust Fund Ratio, assuming the 
payroll tax has been raised by 1.92%, which the 2003 AB75 indicated should balance the 
system. The figure shows that the median ratio crosses zero and turns negative in 2074, 
falling to -82 in 2200. The mean ratio crosses zero a bit later, but falls much faster, 
ending at below -150 by 2200. The upper 67% probability bound (that is, at 83.3%) also 
goes increasingly negative soon after 2120. Clearly, a tax increase of 1.92% will not put 
the system on a sustainable footing, even with quite a lot of luck.  
Simple Measures of Sustainability 
Based on our stochastic projection of the finances of the system, which consists of 1000 
stochastic sample paths, we can calculate the Stable or Flat Fund Ratio measure for each 
one at a 75 year horizon. This gives us a probability distribution for the measure, which is 
plotted in Figure 3.4. The median is 4.36%, which suggests that under the stable 
assumption, the infinite horizon imbalance is 4.36% of the present value of payroll. 
Alternatively, an immediate and permanent tax increase of 4.36% would put the system 
in sustainable balance. This compares to a similar calculation of 4.2% reported in Lee and 
Yamagata (2003). 99% of the probability distribution for this measure lies between 0% 
and 10%.  
 
Similarly, we can find the probability distribution for the Unstable measure of infinite 
horizon imbalance, as shown in Figure 3.5. First, we note that as expected, the Unstable 
measure indicates a larger imbalance, with a median equal to 5.21% of the present value 
of payroll. Second, we note that the probability interval is extremely wide compared to 
the that for the stable, with probability mass spread from -30% to +30%. The width of 
this range is an artifact of the unstable method in the stochastic context, and no 
importance should be attached to it. We will see below that the correct range is far 
narrower.  
Results of 500 Year Stochastic Projections 
We described above how the infinite horizon projections are carried out. Actuarial 
Balances can be calculated for different horizons, and the Trustees’ Reports generally 
give them for horizons of 25, 50 and 75 years, as well as for the infinite horizon in recent 
years. Figure 3.6 plots percentiles of the probability distributions for Actuarial Balances 
calculated over a continuum of horizons up to 500 years. Thus, for example, the line 
labeled “50%tile” portrays the median AB as a function of horizon. We see that it drops 
rapidly to increasingly negative values in the first century, reaching about -3% in 2100, 
and around -4% in 2200, while dropping more an more slowly thereafter, and 
approximately leveling off in the fifth century. This is the case for all the other 
probability percentile lines, which indicates that the probability distribution has stabilized 
after 500 years and extending the horizon further would add little. To make sure the 
meaning of these lines is clear, if we pick some particular horizon, such as 200 years, we 
could say that there is a 2.5% chance that the true AB is less than -9% at this horizon, 
while there is also a 2.5% chance that the true AB is greater than -1%, with a median of 
4% as noted above.  
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Now consider one specific horizon, at 500 years. The percentiles in Figure 3.6 at a 
horizon of 500 years provide five points on the full probability distribution for the year 
2500. Figure 3.7 plots the full probability distribution of Actuarial Balances at the 500 
year horizon. Here we see that the median is -5.15% of the present value of payroll 
(which corresponds to the 50%tile line shown in Figure 3.6 at this horizon), and mean is -
5.37%. Much as with the probability distribution for the Flat Fund Ratio measure, the 
probability mass is almost entirely between 0% and -10%, but with a bit more out on the 
negative tail for the 500 year projection. These various measures are contrasted in the 
following summary table. 
 
INFINITE HORIZON MEASURE OF 
ACTUARIAL BALANCE 
PERCENT OF PV OF 
TAXABLE PAYROLL 
2003 (2004) Trustees’ Report   -3.7     (3.5) 
Stochastic Projection (median)  -5.15 
Flat Fund Ratio (median of Stochastic 
Projection at 75 years) 
-4.36 
Unstable Measure (median of 
Stochastic Projection at 75 years) 
-5.21 
 
We note that the unstable measure agrees very closely with the 500 year projection, 
which suggests, but does not establish, that it might be a simple alternative to carrying 
out the detailed projections over 75 years, at least to obtain a central value. The Flat Fund 
Ratio measure also does surprisingly well, given its simplicity, and the strong and false 
assumption on which it rests (rates of growth of revenues and costs are equal and 
constant after 75 years). We also note that all three of the measures based on our 
stochastic projections show substantially greater imbalances than does the Trustees’ 
Report. This most likely reflects the difference in the mortality projection, which Lee and 
Yamagata (2003) found to make about twice as much difference over the infinite horizon 
(about 1 to 2%) as over the 75 year horizon (about .5%).  
 
The probability interval for the Flat Fund Ratio estimate of the infinite horizon balance 
appears very similar to the interval for the actual 500 year Actuarial Balance, although 
the medians are somewhat different. However, any temptation to believe that the Flat 
Fund Ratio distribution is credible is quashed by inspection of a scatter plot of the 
stochastic Flat Fund Ratios at the 75 year horizon versus the 500 year outcomes for 
Actuarial Balance, as shown in Figure 3.8. The correlation is essentially zero, so the Flat 
Fund Ratio criterion is not identifying trajectories that are headed in particularly costly or 
particularly inexpensive directions. Rather, the correspondence of the two probability 
distributions is coincidental. When one thinks about the quite different basis for the two 
distributions, that is not surprising.  
 
We can conclude that it is best to carry out the full stochastic projection over a long 
horizon of around 500 years, but that a pretty good approximation of the central tendency 
may be obtained from the 75 year Unstable measure, at least in the present circumstances. 
Whether it will be a good approximation in other circumstances as well remains to be 
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seen. The Flat Fund Ratio also provides an acceptable measure, although when costs are 
rising more rapidly than revenues it will underestimate the imbalance.  
 
So far, we have expressed the imbalance relative to the present value of payroll. 
However, we can also report the distribution of the infinite horizon imbalance in dollars, 
as is done in Figure 3.9. We see that the median present value of the imbalance is 18 
trillion dollars, or about 1.6 times GNP at the start of 2003. This figure of 18 trillion is 
substantially larger than the 10.5 trillion reported by the 2003 Trustees’ Report for the 
open group infinite horizon obligation, at 3.7% of payroll. Given our estimate of 5.15% 
of payroll, for the same payroll we would get 14.6 trillion; the balance must be due to a 
higher projection of the present value of payroll, due to lower mortality or to other 
differences in our projection methodology, including the fact that we are reporting the 
median of a stochastic outcome, rather than a deterministic projection.  
 
The High Cost of Delay 
 
Figure 3.6 showed the amount of uncertainty in the 500-year actuarial balance. It is 
tempting to view this dispersion, and to conclude that the difference between raising 
payroll taxes by 0% or 1.92% or 5.15% is swamped by uncertainty, and adjustment could 
easily be made later. If adjustment is made relatively quickly, this might be so. But we 
must keep in mind that the actuarial imbalances shown in Figure 3.6 are not simple 
averages of all the imbalances year by year from now over the next 500 years. Rather 
they are heavily weighted averages, with the weights given by the residual discounting 
factor, by which we mean the 3% real rate of interest that is assumed, less the 1.1% 
growth rate in covered real wages that is assumed, less the approximate rate of population 
growth of .5%, for a residual discount rate of 1.4% per year. Here are the relative weights 












A 1% increase in the payroll tax rate implemented for the first year is worth twice as 
much as one implemented for the 50
th year, and almost 70 times as much as a 1% 
increase implemented for the 300
th year.  
 
Dates of Insolvency 
These measures are intended to indicate the size of the policy adjustment needed to put 
the system on a sustainable path. Nonetheless, a probability of insolvency remains, and it 
would be poor policy indeed to raise taxes or cut benefits to the point where the 
probability of future insolvency approached zero. It is much more sensible to adjust taxes 
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and benefits as the future reveals itself, so as to keep the program on track. The 
sustainability measures we have discussed and estimated strive to indicate the likely 
center of the range of policy adjustments that would prove necessary.  
 
If payroll taxes were raised by 5.15%, which is the median Actuarial Balance over the 
500 year horizon, then we should expect that the system would nonetheless become 
insolvent (Trust Fund equal to zero) in less than 500 years about 50% of the time. This is 
what is shown in Figure 3.10, which gives the histogram of dates of insolvency under a 
5.15% tax increase (from 12.4% to 17.55%). We see that there is a 10% chance of 
insolvency by 2100 despite this hefty tax increase, a 20% chance by 2125, and a 28% 
chance by 2150.  
 
Figure 3.11 shows the same for the Flat Fund Ratio Tax increase of 4.36%, or about .8% 
less. Here we see a 36% chance that the system would stay solvent for 500 years, and 
nearly a 20% chance that it would become insolvent by 2100, rising to 35% by 2125, and 
to 43% by 2050.  
How Big Would the Trust Fund Get? 
It is important to keep clearly distinct the use of these measures of imbalance on the one 
hand, and prescriptions for correcting these imbalances on the other. Because it is simple 
and intuitive to present these measures as equal to the size of the immediate and 
permanent increase in the payroll tax rate that would be necessary to restore the system to 
balance in the long term, it is easy to slide into viewing immediate and permanent tax 
increases as the appropriate policy remedy. There are alternatives. One is to reduce 
benefits, and these measures could just as well (but somewhat less clearly and simply) be 
couched in terms of necessary benefit reductions. But more to the point in the present 
context, one could plan a gradual increase in tax rates (or benefit cuts) that would 
distribute the costs of adjustment in different ways across generations, and that would 
also make it possible to respond on a regular basis to emerging trends in demography, 
economy, functional status at older ages, and retirement behavior.  
 
Having said that, in this section we will explore the implications of instituting immediate 
tax increases corresponding to the measured imbalances. In particular, we will examine 
the trends in trust fund ratios and in size of trust fund implied by these tax increases.  
 
We begin by looking at median Trust Fund Ratio through 2200, for tax increases equal to 
the Trustees’ 75 year Actuarial Balance measure, 1.92%; equal to the Flat Fund Ratio 
Tax, 4.36%; and equal to the Unstable measure, 5.21% (very close to the infinite horizon 
Actuarial Balance measure of 5.15%, which will therefore not be shown separately). 
These are shown in Figure 3.12. We have already noted that the Trust Fund Ratio goes 
negative in 2074 with the 1.92% increase, as was shown in Figure 3.3, having peaked in 
2019 at 6.4 times Costs. The Trust Fund Ratio for the Flat Fund Ratio Tax is constant in 
the 2070’s by construction, where it peaks at 13.3 times Costs, but it declines steadily 
thereafter and has become negative before 2200. We have already indicated that it is an 
underestimate of the adjustment needed for sustainability, but the rapidity of its decline is 
nonetheless surprising to us. With an increase equal to the Unstable amount (or nearly 
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equivalently, to the infinite horizon Actuarial Balance), the Trust Fund Ratio reaches a 
high near 27 times Costs toward 2200, and appears to have stabilized.  
 
We have just looked at projections for the Trust Fund Balance relative to Costs, which 
has the advantage of factoring out the scale of the economy. It is also interesting to look 
at the absolute amount of the Trust Fund Balance. Figure 3.13 plots the median Trust 
Fund Balance in 2002 dollars under the Flat Fund Ratio Tax increase of 4.36%. We see 
that it rises to 100 trillion dollars around 2150, before declining precipitously to -35 
trillion by 2200. These are huge numbers, and difficult to interpret without considering 
the scale of the economy as a whole, which is greatly expanded by labor force growth 
and real wage growth.  
 
While dividing by they systems Costs, as with the Trust Fund Ratio, is one convenient 
way to adjust for the scale of the economy, perhaps the simplest number to interpret is the 
ratio of the Trust Fund to the level of GDP. Figure 3.14 shows selected percentiles of the 
probability distribution for this ratio, expressed as a percent, for a tax increase equal to 
the Flat Fund Ratio Tax increase of 4.36%, through 2080. The median ratio reaches 
105% of GDP in the 2070s. While the median flattens out, and then declines (outside the 
range of this graph), the mean continues to rise, surpassing 170% by the end of the plot 
range, with no end in sight. We also show the 2/3 probability range, with its upper bound 
(labeled 83.3%) asymmetrically high and rising rapidly, reaching above 300% of GDP by 
the late 2070s. The lower 16.7% bound remains positive throughout, but has dropped 
below 30% by the late 2070s. This great range of outcomes for a policy that is supposed 
to be sustainable demonstrates the absolute necessity to maintain policy flexibility to 
adjust to changing circumstances as they unfold.  
 
As we would expect, a similar plot for the infinite horizon Actuarial Balance tax increase 
of 5.15% shows an even greater increase of the Trust Fund relative to GDP. The median 
reaches nearly 150%, and the 83.3% bound reaches 375%, by the late 2070s.  
 
Balances of this sort could not be held as government bonds, since that would require that 
the rest of the government would go in debt to an extent that is not now imaginable. An 
alternative would be to hold the Trust Fund in equities, in which case it would account 
for a very sizable portion of the domestic capital stock. But these issues are beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
Conclusions 
1.  Many issues surround infinite horizon forecasts, and the whole enterprise can 
certainly be questioned. Nonetheless, we have found it useful simply to extend the 
range of the stochastic forecasting models to very distant horizons. We call these 
“routine” or “business as usual” stochastic forecasts, because their uncertainty does 
not reflect the possibility of structural shifts. They understate actual uncertainty.  
2.  Both the Flat Fund Ratio Tax measure and the Unstable measure are useful simple 
approximations to the deterministic or median infinite horizon open group imbalance 
measure. The Flat Fund Ratio is the immediate and permanent tax increase that would 
be needed to hold the ratio of the Trust Fund to Costs constant over the last two years 
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of the 75-year projection. It is more intuitive and therefore easier to explain than the 
Unstable measure, but it underestimates the imbalance, whereas the Unstable measure 
(explained in the report) gives a very good approximation to the infinite horizon 
measure, at least under current circumstances.  
3.  The 2004 Trustees Report indicates an infinite horizon open group imbalance equal to 
3.5% of payroll, consistent with Lee and Yamagata (2003) when the Actuary’s 
mortality projection is used. Based on our 500-year projection, we estimate it to be 
5.15%, substantially larger. Our two simple methods, based on our 75 year 
projections, indicate levels of 4.36% for the Flat Fund Ratio measure, and 5.21% for 
the Unstable measure.  
4.  Good estimates of the uncertainty of the simple measures cannot be derived from 
stochastic forecasts over the 75 year horizon, at least using the methods we have 
attempted. Therefore the simple measures are useful only for central tendency.  
5.  The “routine” uncertainty surrounding the infinite horizon estimates of Summary 
Actuarial Balance is about 40% greater than the uncertainty of the 75 year 
projections: the 95% probability interval is 9% wide versus 6.5% for the 75-year 
horizon.  
6.  Raising tax rates immediately by an amount intended to achieve sustainability would 
imply substantial chances of huge Trust Fund accumulations that neither could nor 
should be realized in practice, at least not through holdings of government bonds. 
Adaptive policies that maintain the Trust Fund ratio at a desirable level seem more 
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2.5%tile     16.7%tile     50%tile    83.3%tile     95%tile
 −10.50       −7.75          −5.15       −3.00          −1.30
Average = −5.37
Figure 3.7 Distribution of 500−year summarized actuarial balance





















Figure 3.8 Sustainable tax rate under stable assumption by 500−year actuarial balance
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  −316         −60          −18        −5.7        −1.8
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